Today it is clear to me that at that time I assessed many facts entirely falsely, even especially important facts. Truly captured in error, I nourished illusions which later deceived me; then however I fought, sacrificing everything, for their actualization. I ask myself whether I now can give any guarantee that my judgments of today are correct. Naturally I cannot.
-Arnošt Kolman 1 Philosophy of science in the twentieth century has been, to a striking degree, Habsburg. Everyone concedes that Vienna was a central location for the reformulation and promulgation of the dominant strands in twentiethcentury philosophy of science. The Austrian capital was not only home to the Vienna Circle (Wiener Kreis)-the eventual moniker for a group of philosophers who developed their rigorous theories following the inspiration of Ernst Mach , local professor of physics and philosophy-but it was also the point of origin for Karl Popper (1902 Popper ( -1994 and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), two of the most determined critics of logical empiricism. 2 Historical circumstances (fascism, world war) led to an exodus of these Viennese Kulturträger to the United Kingdom and especially the United States, which has understandably drawn the attention of historians of Anglo-American analytic philosophy of science. 3 Yet Vienna is a remarkably narrow slice through the diversity of the Habsburg Empire, whether one is talking about politics or philosophy of science. As Mary Jo Nye has recently demonstrated, it is important to recognize that the ''roots of [Michael] Polanyi's 'republic of science' lay in his Hapsburg heritage,'' situating tacit knowledge and post-positivism in the physical chemist and philosopher's upbringing in Budapest (as well as his professional experiences in Berlin and Manchester). 4 The case of Polanyi (1891-1976) not only expands the geographical ambit of the Austro-Hungarian shaping of twentieth-century intellectually speaking, as he put it in his oral history: ''The German University of Prague was really no different. It was just a branch of Vienna. '' 8 But in practice he worked to expand the philosophy, not merely continue it. For example, he was instrumental in arranging the hire of Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) as professor of natural philosophy at the German University in 1932. The eventual dispersal of Mach, Frank, and Carnap to Austria and the United States has obscured the important role of Prague in fostering logical empiricism.
This essay explores the dispersal of a philosophy of science both to and from this third Habsburg city, but it is not about logical empiricism. Another major movement dominated philosophical reflection on science in the twentieth century and had a significant impact on the conduct and development of the sciences themselves: dialectical materialism. As the official philosophy of science of the Soviet Union, and thus of the largest scientific and technical community in the world, dialectical materialism has attracted its own cadre of historians, with much of the discussion about whether the philosophy had beneficial or (more often) deleterious consequences. 9 This historiography, however, is almost entirely Soviet in focus, omitting the rest of the Eastern Bloc, and it remains detached from the parallel history of logical empiricism. The latter point is rather odd, since many of the logical positivists, such as Philipp Frank, engaged with the Marxists repeatedly (and Frank himself was even criticized by none other than Vladimir Lenin). 10 Prague was the home city of one of the most prolific and enigmatic of dialectical materialists: Arnošt Kolman (1892 Kolman ( -1979 . 11 Once you begin to look 11. His name has several spellings-Colman, Kol'man (transcribed from Cyrillic)-but I will always use Kolman (except in direct bibliographic citations). As he notes in his Russian-language memoir, when he was captured by the Russians on the Eastern Front in World War I, all of the names were transcribed from the German. Hence, instead of ''Arnošt'' or (as would be more common in Russian) ''Ernst,'' he appeared as ''Ernest'' in Cyrillic transcription. E. Kol'man, My for him, Kolman turns out to be ubiquitous, having written on philosophy of mathematics, logic, history of mathematics, philosophy of physics, cybernetics, and numerous other fields. 12 In conventional histories, however, he appears either as a footnote or as anéminence grise who was involved in some of the most notorious episodes in the encounter of science with Marxism. Loren Graham and Jean-Michel Kantor, in their history of Soviet mathematics, recall that Kolman was often called (behind his back, of course) the ''dark angel,'' and consider him ''an ideologue of a particularly dangerous type, a man who took his Marxism very seriously and considered all other philosophical viewpoints as threats to the Soviet state. '' 13 A Russian historian of the development of science studies in the Soviet Union considers him ''one of the most complex and contradictory figures of our historiography. '' 14 For David Joravsky, Kolman was simultaneously ''one of the most savage Stalinists on the front of science and philosophy'' but also ' rely on Kolman's own self-presentation in interviews or especially his copious memoir (available in German, Russian, Czech, and multiple Scandinavian languages). 17 Given his swings to and from Stalinism, this memoir-composed while he was in the Soviet Union but published only posthumously from Sweden-ranges from accurate and insightful to highly unreliable. The account that follows uses the memoirs in conjunction with his technical, popular, and archival writings to frame Kolman as a character in his own right.
Kolman's case is admittedly atypical, and the sheer sweep of his lifeespecially the seemingly inconsistent behavior of the 1930s and the 1970s-has rarely been analyzed outside of his own apologetic memoir; doing so reveals a trajectory that, aside from its intrinsic interest, has the potential to deepen the history of dialectical materialism in both the Soviet Union and especially the satellite states. The very broad scope comes at a cost: the specific nuances of his intellectual positions (which range from the sophisticated to the workmanlike to the incoherent) are here subordinated to the biography. This is not an essay in intellectual history, and certainly not a philosophical study intended to either exonerate or condemn dialectical materialism; it is rather a biographically driven cultural history that uses Kolman's extraordinary productivity and longevity to illuminate the various contexts in which he operated. The perspective reveals a clear arc: in his earlier career, he saw dialectical materialism as inextricably linked to the Soviet project of building communism, and thus subject to brutal instrumentalization in the service of higher goals; his experiences in the late 1940s and 1950s (Prague, prison, cybernetics, and Prague again)-precisely because they removed him from the centers of authoritysevered this personal identification of dialectical materialism with the Soviet project; from his defection to his death, he maintained a commitment to the former while vigorously attacking the latter. Kolman's case suggests that attention to the varieties of dialectical materialism in practice, not just in philosophical theory, both in various sites in the Soviet Union and in other socialist states, might reveal a more complex intellectual and social dynamic than indicated in extant scholarship.
PART I: TOWARD STALIN
Arnošt Kolman was born in 1892 in Prague to Julie and Jaromír, the latter a non-observant Jew who worked as a postal official. Jaromír, typical of Jews of his generation, insisted that his children be raised in German; Arnošt, typical of Jews of his own generation, preferentially adopted Czech as his primary language as he grew older, and his higher education was exclusively in Czech-speaking institutions. 18 As a teenager, Kolman recounted that he ''became a Jewish nationalist. I was raised in the spirit of national Romanticism, that is to say the Czech, and so was I raised also at school and by the entire environment in Bohemia. ' 27 Kolman had already begun writing pieces on general philosophical topics in the late 1920s, but not necessarily engaged with science. 28 The publication of Friedrich Engels's Dialectics of Nature in the Soviet Union in 1929 provided a vehicle to combine his philosophical and propagandistic career with his long-standing interest in the natural sciences. 29 This book, along with Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, formed the canon of dialectical materialist thought. A necessarily overly brief and simplified version of the most important elements for the philosophy in general and for Kolman in particular were the insistence on rigid materialism (no spiritual forces, idealistic archetypes, noumena)-a metaphysical postulate that also required rejection of anti-metaphysical positions such as logical empiricism-and a commitment to dialectical reasoning: the negation of opposites, the transition from quantity to quality, and separate spheres of explanation (social, biological, physical). Depending on the school of thought, this was supposed to be descriptive (scientists reasoned dialectically), naturalized (the laws of nature were themselves dialectical manifestations), or both.
For Kolman, direct connection of Soviet power with dialectical materialism began with Engels and with Karl Marx's mathematical manuscripts, and it is important to underscore that he started out as a member of the apparat and only subsequently came to Dialectics of Nature. Science soon became his particular theme. Although he would occasionally publish on technical conceptual points of Marxist philosophy, from the early 1930s onward almost all of Kolman's writing was about science, and a good portion of it was vigorous attack.
30 I will focus here on two examples. The first episode is an important milestone in the history of social constructivist thought: the 1931 International Congress for the History of Science and Technology, which took place in London. International gatherings of historians of science are not usually the stuff of legend, but the unexpected presence of the Soviet delegation-whose contributions were collected later that year in the influential Science at the Cross-Roads-and especially the presentation by physicist Boris Hessen, ''The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's Principia,'' have repeatedly galvanized social historians of knowledge. The other Soviet essays are rarely read, although the noted geneticist Nikolai Vavilov, physicist Abram Ioffe, and leading Bolshevik Nikolai Bukharin penned their own contributions. The least distinguished member of the delegation was a man rendered in the table of contents as ''E. Colman,'' who authored three pieces on the applications of dialectical materialism to contemporary science and mathematics. 31 They did not leave much of an impression, and Kolmanwhose English was among the best in the group-joined in shopping trips and wrote glowing accounts of the Soviet triumph upon his return. about it by historian of science Loren Graham in the 1970s, he was practically the only member to survive to the end of World War II. Every other member (besides Ioffe) was executed in the purges or died in a prison camp. That they experienced that fate, and that Kolman did not, are related. On August 22, 1971 (before his defection) and on April 22, 1977 (afterward), Graham asked Kolman about the experience, and the philosopher related that he had been Communist Party secretary to the delegation, specifically tasked with keeping the others-many suspected of ideological deviations-in line. Party members were required to emphasize Marxism in their talks, and Kolman reported that Bukharin had fallen short of the mark, but Hessen (whom Kolman had previously attacked in print) had performed well.
33 (This did not save Hessen; he was executed in December 1936.) Kolman had other duties, such as successfully helping to persuade physicist Peter Kapitza, then living in exile in Cambridge, to return to the Soviet Union.
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The second episode is the notorious Luzin Affair, a confrontation that struck at the heart of the Moscow mathematical community. Since this history has been told in considerable detail elsewhere, my purpose here is to highlight the parallels with the London Congress: Kolman's crucial ideological role, but his simultaneous and deliberate self-effacement from the record. 35 Kolman, who considered himself an important member of the Moscow Mathematical Society, had sniped at the leading figures of the self-designated ''Moscow mathematical school'' as far back as 1924, when he attacked Dmitrii Egorov-toppled six years later-and also, in 1931, Egorov's successor, Nikolai Luzin (specifically singled out in Kolman's presentations in London). 36 Although some of Kolman's antagonism against Luzin stemmed from personal dislike, Luzin's covert but clear commitment to Orthodox Christianity also furnished intellectual grounds. 37 In 1936, the philosopher arranged a sting targeting the mathematician.
Luzin took the bait. In June 1936, Luzin accepted an invitation to visit G. I. Shuliapin's high school mathematics course. A reporter for the newspaper Izvestiia, tipped off about Luzin's presence, was also in attendance. Luzin was impressed by the students, and the reporter invited him to write a piece on his experience, which was published on June 27 as ''A Pleasant Disappointment. '' 38 Luzin succumbed to the temptation to exaggerate the competence of the students, and he related that they had made no errors and had astonished him (the ''disappointment'' of the title) with their mathematical acumen. On July 2, Shuliapin responded in Pravda, claiming that Luzin's excessive praise was a disservice to Soviet educators, who did not need false applause. 39 This was a rather high-profile rebuke, and attentive academics of the 1930s saw what was coming. The real denunciation, ''On Enemies in a Soviet Mask,'' published anonymously in Pravda the following day, launched into the script of an ideological campaign against Luzin. ''This idiosyncratic wrecking in science by Academician Luzin is evident in his own works,'' the author noted, before declaring the leading mathematician a fascist: ''We know where Academician Luzin came from: we know, that he is one of the pack of the dishonorable 'Moscow Mathematical School,' the philosophy of which was Black Hundred and whose animating ideas were behemoths of Russian reaction: Orthodoxy and autocracy. We know that even right now he is not far from similar views, perhaps a bit modernized in a fascistic manner.'' 40 As Aleksey Levin observed in his 1990 account of the dispute, the Pravda piece could only have appeared so expeditiously ''as a result of some high official's support or direct order.'' The tone of the anonymous article and even the wording pointed to Kolman's previous attacks on Luzin, and Levin observed that he was the only member of the mathematical community who had enough standing with the Party to arrange such an affair: ''The subsequent article could have been published only with his sanction. '' 41 At first, the public pillorying of Luzin looked like it might end with arrest and exile, or even death, but the campaign pulled up short just as suddenly as it had begun. Luzin was fired from the presidium of the Mathematical Group and left his professorship at Moscow State University and the Mathematical Institute of the Academy of Sciences. He retained his status as academician, however, and took a post at another research institute in the Academy. In 1941, he was returned to the Mathematical Institute and, in 1943, to the University; his rehabilitation is visible in the honorable obituary that followed his death (from natural causes) in 1950.
You would not know that Kolman was involved at all from perusing his publications, even in his confessional dissident period. In fact, Kolman went out of his way to deny that he had ever conducted himself in such a manner. For example, in his interview with his son-in-law František Janouch, he declared that ''I can maintain with a clean conscience that I was never a participant and even less an initiator of personal persecutions. Certainly there were not a few who shoved their talented opponents out of the way through denunciations and thus advanced their careers; I never, however, belonged to them. '' 42 In his interview with Rabkin, likewise after his defection, Kolman specifically brought up Luzin as an example of unfortunate ideological persecution, with the strong implication that he had nothing to do with it. 43 We Since LUZIN is a specialist in the abstract part of set theory, which has no practical applications, and in the capacity of the leader of the so-called Moscow Mathematical School he boasted that he ''had never solved a single concrete equation,'' then it is unlikely that at TsAGI he can accomplish significant good.
It is necessary to underscore that LUZIN is closely connected with the eminent French mathematician BOREL, an active collaborator with the French military. In his visit in 1929 to Paris LUZIN stayed with BOREL.
The following excerpt from a report at a meeting of the Academy about his foreign trip speaks to his militant idealism: ''evidently, the natural numbers do not present an absolutely objective formation. Evidently they represent a function of the head of that mathematician who in a given instance speaks about the natural numbers. Evidently, among the tasks of arithmetic there are tasks which are absolutely unsolvable.'' On this theme during his trip to France a book was written by LUZIN and published there.
Besides LUZIN most recently Professor GASTERIN began to work at TsAGI, who left in protest from the Institute of Physics at MGU 1, where he conducted destructive anti-societal work.
22/2.32 E. Kol'man. Kolman.) Notice in the letter that arguments about political heterodoxy (friendship with foreigners, association with those who had been previously arrested) are seamlessly juxtaposed with a dialectical materialist critique of Luzin's ostensible ''militant idealism.'' As in London, Kolman oscillated between the claims of political authority and those of consistency with the official philosophy, and considered deviations from one as related to the other.
After his (partial) victory over one of the leading mathematicians of the day, Kolman was impervious for the rest of the decade. At the height of the purges, he took a leading role in the debates concerning the philosophical status and orthodoxy of new developments in theoretical physics, especially relativity and quantum theory. He always presented himself as a moderate voice-at least moderate relative to the tenor of the times. As historians have noted, Kolman demonstrated a more comprehensive grasp of the scientific issues than the most aggressive philosophers, and while he insisted that philosophy should be the leading discipline, he conceded that there were still open scientific questions and a definitive judgment on contemporary physics would have to be deferred. 45 He even skirted the notorious debates over Mendelian genetics (identified with Trofim Lysenko) without committing himself either way. published occasionally abroad, at a time when too much exposure in foreign learned journals could be a liability rather than an asset. Kolman In 1945, fresh from wartime evacuation to Alma Ata and work for the Red Army on German and Czechoslovak questions, Arnošt Kolman (not Ernest Kol'man) was returned to Prague as the head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, one of the largest in Europe. After years of Nazi occupation the victorious Soviets were immensely popular in Prague, and Kolman, appointed a professor of philosophy at Charles University, basked in the glow of approbation. 50 The propaganda went both ways: he relayed Moscow's communications to the Czechs and Slovaks, especially in a series of articles in the journal Tvorba and in public 49. ''Thus, in our Soviet society, in the society which Stalin leads from socialism to communism, science, having been earlier one of many ideological strands, was transformed into a serious force of social development and is furthermore transformed into a stimulus of activity for the conscious person, in the content of his daily life.'' Kol'man, ''Stalin i nauka,'' PZM, no. 12 question-and-answer sessions covering topics as diverse as atomic weapons and the status of women in the Soviet Union, and he also presented Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union as a triumphant example of the spread of Communism.
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He focused on securing victory for the Communist Party in Czechoslovakiaa victory ensured following the February 1948 coup against the Third Republic-but also continued to publish and lecture on the history and philosophy of science, including a notable 1948 lecture on heat death of the universe at Charles University, with citations to Czech philosophers like Tomáš Masaryk and Augustin Smetana. 52 Overconfident, Kolman went too far. After the Communist seizure of power, he quickly became apprehensive of the direction taken by Czech leaders, especially Rudolf Slánský, General Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. In the wake of Josip Broz's (a.k.a. Tito's) break from the Stalinist camp in the direction of a nationalist communism for Yugoslavia, Kolman thought Slánský was headed in the same direction. As he recalled his actions in his memoirs: ''I thus selected an entirely legal path and sent on 12 September 1948 to the magazine Tvorba, whose editor then was Gustav Bareš, an article with the title 'For a Bolshevik Critique in our KPČ .' I wrote there that in connection with the Yugoslav 'nationalist betrayal' and Polish 'Right opportunism' it is important to practice meaningful self-criticism in one's own ranks.'' 53 Slánský complained to Moscow; Kolman was arrested and sent back. He spent three years incarcerated in the Lubianka headquarters of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), much of it in solitary confinement.
In 1952, he was summarily released. This was not a result of de-Stalinization, for Stalin did not die until March 1953, and releases of his political prisoners took longer still. Rather, Kolman was freed because Stalin had had enough of Slánský, and the latter was put through a show-trial and executed in December vindication of sorts, but an awkward one. Kolman, not entirely rehabilitated, now had to make his way anew in the Moscow academic world. He obtained a job teaching mathematics at the Moscow Automechanical Institute and resumed publishing Stalinist articles. 54 As Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the victor in the behind-the-scenes struggle to succeed Stalin, Kolman began to moderate his philosophical views to suit the new order. 55 Khrushchev was a lucky break for the philosopher, as Kolman had worked for him on the Moscow city council in the mid-1930s and could approach the General Secretary for assistance in obtaining a more suitable job. The request went through channels, but the philosophers at the Academy of Sciences declined to take Kolman back; needless to say, the mathematicians were also uninterested in welcoming Kolman. A harmless posting was found: at the Academy's Institute for the History of Natural Science and Technology. 56 Building a new identity as a historian of science, justified in no small part by his attendance at the 1931 London Congress, Kolman took to the position like a fish to water, and began writing histories of mathematics. He had ventured in this area before, having written in 1945 a stridently anti-fascist biography of Nikolai Lobachevskii. 57 (A revised edition, published in 1956 from his new perch at the Institute, expunged the Stalinist rhetoric.) 58 He would retain this affiliation for the rest of his Soviet career, yet continued to proselytize for dialectical materialism, including 
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Even though he was now officially a historian, his great intellectual engagement of the 1950s came not from contemplating the past but from plunging into the future. He discovered cybernetics, the science of control and feedback created by MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener. Cybernetics played an outsized role in the later Soviet period as it moved from ideologically demonized pseudoscience to central pillar of late Soviet planning. There are two ways to tell the story of the stunning rescue of cybernetics from the tundra of official disapproval. The first, and certainly the more significant, concerns the mobilization by mathematicians and electrical engineers to persuade the Soviet state of the utility of computers, in part by stoking fears of American achievements in this area. The second story concerns how a maverick philosopher of science pushed for cybernetics as the pivotal tool that would help usher in a communist utopia. That philosopher was Kolman.
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On November 19, 1954, Kolman gave a lecture at the Academy of Social Sciences entitled ''What Is Cybernetics?,'' which began with an explanation of the fundamental tenets (negative entropy, Turing machines), continued with a Leninist philosophical justification, and then concluded with a rousing exhortation to invest heavily in this science of the future. As he put it in an expanded pamphlet: ''Cybernetic technology is the technology of a communist society in construction. Here it makes possible the transformation of the worker into an engineer-tinkerer, it will enable the annihilation of the existing difference between physical and mental labor, the shortening of the working day, the creation (along with atomic energy) of uncountable material goods and possibilities for the cultural growth of the people.'' 61 Importantly, Kolman was for the first time in his career arguing against the official Soviet line, and using dialectical materialism to make his case; conceptually, he had begun to insert daylight between the two, and the rift would further widen in his later writings on the topic, even as the Soviet state came around on the question of cybernetics. Kolman continued to publish voluminously on cybernetics for both technical and lay audiences (including children), and in Russian, Czech, French, and English. 62 He even was granted the privilege of writing the preface to the Russian translation of Wiener's The Human Use of Human Beings, which situated that work as bourgeois, but still a valuable impetus to the correct Soviet ideological interpretation of this important field. 63 Once again, Kolman was sent to Prague, this time not as a revolutionary but as a defender of the established order. In 1959, he assumed the post of Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, of which he was now appointed a full member. He became a citizen of Czechoslovakia, and, in 1960, was appointed head of the Scientific Board for Philosophy of the Academy and editor in chief of its philosophical journal, Filosofický časopis. The latter became the venue for his many philosophical articles about scientific theories, alongside a new genre: essays on Eastern Bloc philosophy of science, including critiques of Titoist thought and praise of a Bulgarian philosopher. 64 From the vantage point of Prague, Kolman now explored a different aspect of dialectical materialism: its capacity to serve as a unifying force within the Bloc, not simply along spokes radiating from Moscow. Again, Soviet authority and the philosophy of science were becoming increasingly Cybernetics dominated his public writings in Czechoslovakia, which included a popular book, published handsomely by a press that specialized in belles-lettres, entitled Views into the Future. Most of the essays were Czech reworkings of earlier Russian publications, but he also composed a new chapter in the form of a fictional dialogue, and floated ideas about futuristic possibilities like the ''Mentalcaptor,'' an electroencephalographic helmet that would enable mind reading. 66 Both his Russian and Czech writings of the 1960s often dabbled in futurology, as advances in nuclear power and especially space flight captured his imagination. The future became, in fact, the purpose of science:
Science is not only the systematization of the entirety of knowledge of facts, of regularities of the actual world, but it is simultaneously an indication for its complete refashioning. Therefore it is directed forward, to the future, and even when it-as, for example, in history, archaeology, paleontology, etc.-studies the past, it does this in the final account not for the sake of the past itself, but so that we can on its basis judge today's development, and chiefly development in the future. Prediction is the most important living function of science.
67
The future would be cybernetic, and it would be communist-but this socialist, dialectical materialist future is no longer explicitly based in Soviet Moscow.
Kolman was not long for Prague. By the early 1960s it is clear that he had begun to chafe against the constraints of his new position. In 1962, in a statement to the Twelfth Party Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Kolman advocated liberalization of press supervision and greater freedom of publication and travel. 68 In 1963, he situated these demands within a critique of Stalinism, arguing that the Czechoslovak regime needed to purge any residual elements of this deviant form of Marxism and return to Leninist 
fundamentals.
69 Officials in Prague-including many of those who were architects of the liberalizing ''Prague Spring''-once again irritated at this gadfly, sent him back to Moscow. The rejection stung, and Kolman remained bitter at his Czechoslovak colleagues through the next two decades. Although he retained his formal status as an academician, he retired and resumed Soviet citizenship on March 3, 1964.
Given Kolman's understandable propensity to present himself as the hero of his life story, his account of his return to Moscow is characteristic:
Why did I really leave Prague? Besides the mentioned reasons of old age, the abnormal relations between me and the leadership of the Central Committee as well as the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences were in very strong measure determinative for my resolution. If I met the gentlemen from the Central Committee and the Academy, they greeted me, to be sure, shook my hand, laughed hollowly and made compliments; behind my back however they did everything to destroy my work and to discredit me.
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His Institute was poorly funded and understaffed, and the Presidium repeatedly failed to fulfill its promises. Permission for Kolman to run a philosophical congress in Prague was rescinded without explanation. His sense of selfimportance was grossly offended:
And as to what concerns my person, I was then in Czechoslovakia easily the oldest Communist with the longest experience with Party work-and perhaps the only one still living who had known Lenin. Despite this they did not select me as a delegate to the 12th Party Congress, yes, they even neglected to grant me a guest pass, and they did not even invite me to the celebration that the Central Committee and the Prague City Committee put together on 22 April 1960 to celebrate Lenin's ninetieth birthday. So I left Prague, but I did not give myself any illusions that things would be better for me in Moscow. Despite perceived limitations on his professional advancement, the nowretired Kolman was intensively active in writing and attending philosophical and historical congresses. His third exit from Prague did not disrupt his work to connect Eastern Bloc philosophy, this time under the banner of cybernetics, raising logic to a new prominence and demonstrating the need to understand the differences between human and machine cognition.
72 Even more to the point, cybernetics demanded a rearticulation of the concept of ''labor'' within Marxist doctrine, a position that gave him the reputation of a ''revisionist'' among Western observers of postwar communist ideology, despite his political distance from Czechoslovak reformers. 73 Kolman thus reversed his original path to dialectical materialism through Soviet political theory and practice; now Soviet theory would have to adjust to the requirements of scientific philosophy.
By the late 1960s Kolman explicitly indicted common practices among Soviet philosophers, practices that he himself had often indulged in. For example, in an article demanding a return to Leninist thought written for the main Soviet journal of the history of science, he wrote:
One of the most widespread manifestations of the uncreative approach to Marxism is quotation-mongering: instead of proving with facts and theoretical analysis, they simply pull out statements which supposedly are appropriate to the given situation, supposedly support the given proposition. Frequently they ignore the circumstance that the statements of Marx, Engels, or Lenin, ripped from context, can express a sense different than they did for their authors, and that these expressions, with the passage of time, already in different historical conditions, at the contemporary level of the development of science, can be incomplete and sometimes simply inaccurate. In a 1973 article reviewing Werner Heisenberg's autobiographical writings, he lavishly praised the West German statesman of science, whom he had excoriated as a bourgeois idealist in the 1930s, now even positively spinning the physicist's more ambiguous interactions with the Nazi regime. 75 These subtle changes exemplify Kolman's efforts to bring himself closer to Western philosophy of science-closer, but not so close as to dive into the mainstreams of logical empiricism or the emerging post-positivism of Karl Popper or Thomas Kuhn (of both of whose works he was aware). Rather, he at first approached Western Marxists, looking for collegiality and support. Indicative of his strategy, and differing from other examples only in the intensity of the correspondence, is his connection with Dirk Struik, mathematician and historian of science at MIT, and Robert S. Cohen, philosopher of science at Boston University. Although he had met Struik at an underground communist meeting in Weimar Germany-Struik representing the Dutch party, Kolman the Comintern, and both almost arrested-and the two had developed a friendship in the 1930s, the flood of letters to Struik only really began as his self-diagnosed ostracism in the Soviet Union manifested after returning from Prague. 76 The first fruit was an Occasional Paper, edited by Struik and Cohen, published by the American Institute of Marxist Studies, which presented a fairly straightforward dialectical materialist account of scientific certainty in a manner devoid of canonical citations or polemics, identifiable as ''Marxist'' only to cognoscenti. 77 (Editing this was no small matter; Struik wrote Cohen that he and his wife Ruth had ''translated it from Eisenhowerese into what we believe is readable English,'' but that the paper was only ''important as a document to show how in the Soviet Union an attempt is made to break through the dogmatism of the old school.'') 78 The volume of 79 a translation of a set of satirical stories he had composed in Russian about a farcical totalitarian regime. 83 He was, it seemed, a completely changed man. Except that he was still a Marxist, deeply committed to dialectical materialism. As he now represented it, the problem with the Soviet Union was not Marxist or even Leninist ideology, but the Soviet bureaucracy and particularly Stalin. As he declared in a 1978 article: ''It is not right to think that we all were careerists; on the contrary, most persons acted in good faith and this gave their declarations the force of conviction.'' 84 Or, as he put it in his final interviews with Janouch: ''Because the ideas for which I have fought, weapon in hand, with my pen, the ideas of socialism, the unfalsified theory of Marxism, dialectical and historical materialism, are scientifically grounded, are true, are human and are to be actualized. I do not belong to those who swing on the pendulum from one extreme to the other, for whom all that a short time ago they had defended is now made black. I have become no anti-Marxist, no anticommunist [ . . . ].'' 85 His final philosophical publication, which appeared posthumously, was in fact a dialectical-materialist critique of physicist Carl von Weizsäcker, a manuscript he claimed had been censored and pulled from publication in the Soviet Union in 1975. 86 Even at the moment when he was most explicitly anti-Party, he was most affirmatively pro-dialectical materialism. When he died on January 22, 1979, Kolman was eulogized in the Western obituaries as a ''confidant of Lenin and pupil of Einstein,'' neither of which was quite true. 87 His time in the Lubianka and exile was mentioned; the Luzin Affair was not. And then he slipped into oblivion.
CONCLUSION
The great mystery of Kolman's career is why he left the Soviet Union and the Communist Party after so many years of faithful, even exuberant, loyalty and service. Despite Kolman's attempt to retain the philosophy while jettisoning the Party, when communism was dismantled across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, dialectical materialism essentially died with it. Certainly it has no place of prominence in the historiography of the discipline of the philosophy of science, either in the United States or in Russia, let alone in the Czech Republic. The reasons for the silence are different: in the United States, dialectical materialism was often seen as a thin ideological screen, a sideshow from the main intellectual attraction of logical empiricism; in Soviet Russia, despite a robust discussion of the philosophy, Kolman was ignored as a ''non-returner'' (nevozvrashchenets); and in the Czech Republic, the philosophy represented yet another insult imposed from Moscow. 88 These reasons for historiographical neglect are not intellectually grounded. In terms of scale and influence, this was one of the twentieth century's most vigorous philosophies of science, and its history ought to be incorporated into the narratives of the history of philosophy of science we now have. One place to start is with the enigmas encoded in the life of its longest-lived exponent.
Why did Kolman defect? The answer depends, as always, on how seriously one takes the protestations in his autobiographical writings. There are four dominant explanations. The first answer is Stalin: the Soviet experiment was a crusade for social justice and an intellectual juggernaut based on Lenin's clear-sighted philosophy; Stalin perverted all that, and it took first Kolman's incarceration in 1948 and then the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to disillusion him from the political instantiation of what he considered a fundamentally correct philosophy. 89 This narrative played well in dissident circles and Kolman often invoked it.
The second explanation, related to the first and likewise often endorsed by Kolman, was the regime's cruelty in splitting his family apart. The most complete version of his memoirs (the Russian), ends with a lamentation about the Soviets' attempt to keep him from his daughter.
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The third was his experience during the campaign to rehabilitate cybernetics. For Dirk Struik, interpreting Kolman's apostasy from the Communist Party this way granted it a penumbra of intellectual legitimacy and insulated dialectical materialism from taint. As Struik put it in a January 1975 draft letter to Anatoly Dobrynin arguing for an exit visa for Kolman ''in the spirit of Lenin, who always stressed the importance for marxists to study and if necessary to adopt the truly valuable and scientific aspects of a theory,'' his position ''has by now been completely vindicated.'' 91 Kolman's ability to rescue cybernetics from Soviet rejection was akin to his push to rescue Lenin from Stalin's dead hand. The only place he could do this, ostensibly, was outside the Soviet Union.
The final explanation, impossible to dismiss entirely, is opportunism. There is no question that after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Kolman-as a Czech national (though naturalized Soviet citizen) with ties to the Prague intelligentsia-found his professional life constrained. Nauka, the publishing house of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, told Kolman in 1972 that they would not publish his massive manuscript, The Problem of the Infinite, and held up other articles. 92 Kolman repeatedly reiterated his biographical credentials (knowing Lenin, having attended the 1931 London Congress), to no avail.
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From his pre-Sweden point of view, Kolman was perplexed by the taboo the invasion of Czechoslovakia seemed to cast over him. Given that he had been at loggerheads with many of the intellectual leaders of the Prague Spring that had preceded the invasion (part of the reason he had returned to Moscow), and the fact that his post-invasion limited correspondence with former Spring leadersthrough his son-in-law, a physicist and foreign delegate of Charter 77-steered clear of more than casual encouragement, it is difficult to explain his defection entirely by the events of 1968, or to read his support of Czech dissidents from Stockholm entirely at face value. 94 Is it that unreasonable to suppose, when he found the Soviet state immovable, that ambition pushed him to hazard a career in the West?
How we interpret his alienation from the Party and the political regime that he dedicated the majority of his life to defending, sometimes unscrupulously, has implications for how seriously we take him as a thinker-and therefore, how seriously we take the commitment of philosophers like him to dialectical materialism as an intellectual (as opposed to a purely political/ideological) project. Fundamentally, this cannot be resolved from the available sources, precisely because so many of those sources are from Kolman himself. It is impossible, in short, to come to a definitive conclusion about how sincere Kolman was, either in his Stalinist heyday or in his vituperative rejection of the same. This staunchly and consistently anti-religious individual claimed in the preface to the Russian edition of his memoir that it should ''be something in the order of a confession which, as they say, a believing Christian can ameliorate his conscience. So then, I have no shortage of sins on my conscience. Perhaps if I try to self-critically repent of them publically, then in that other world the devils will show me a certain compassion during my roasting. '' 95 There is surely irony here, invoking the ''criticism and self-criticism'' (kritika i samokritika) trope of the Stalinist 1930s, but it is equally clear that Kolman did not intend to ''repudiate everything in my works, there is in them also something positive, and sometimes I have introduced something toward the development of Marxist philosophy of mathematics and the natural sciences. '' 96 Even the most uncharitable interpretation of these statements, however, cannot simply dismiss Kolman from our histories of twentieth-century philosophy of science. No less than Prague-an often-overlooked locale that saw the birth or adolescence of many of the logical empiricist doctrines that animated Western philosophy-the story of Czechs and others who went East and signed up for a different philosophy of science (and a different political ideology) must be integrated if we are going to produce an accurate account of the development of the discipline. Kolman's case indicates how crucial the experience outside of the Soviet Union was for disaggregating dialectical materialism from other aspects of communist rule, and therefore the story can only be told by incorporating perspectives from the Eastern Bloc, as well as East Asia. Along with martyrs and apostates, the story also requires its dark angels.
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